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ABSTRACT
The paper analyses the impact of government budget deficits in a Cwa-
country general equilibrium model with imperfect commodity substitution and
imperfect capital mobility. Account is taken of optimizing agents, finite
lives, capital accumulation, intertemporal budget constraints for the
governments and private sectors, current-account dynamics and floating
exchange rates. To satisfy the solvency condition of the governments
proportional control rules for taxation and public investment are applied.
Numerical methods are used to trace the effects of a unilateral increase in
exhaustive government spending. Special cases considered include endogenous
changes in consumers' preferences and accumulation oF social overhead
capital.
1 I am indebted to Frederick van der Ploeg for helpful comments on an
earlier draft of the paper.1
1. Introduction
Governments run deficits for some time to obtain short-run economic or
political targets. In this paper the short-run results of such a policy are
put in the background of analysing the long-run consequences of a loose
fiscal stance. In an international context government deficits may be
reflected in deficits on the current account and such twin deficits have
important consequences for long-run welfare. There are a number of
interesting and related questions which may be asked in this connection. A
rise in government expenditure crowds out private spending. If so, how are
the consequences of crowding-out spread across different countries? The
answer to this question is directly related to the functioning of the
international capital market. Another point is whether the consequences of a
net debtor position are reinforced by a deterioration of the terms of trade
in the long run. On the one hand a debtor nation has to service its external
debt, which puts pressure on its real exchange rate to depreciate. On the
other hand, crowding-out of investment lowers output end may therefore
increase the relative price of domestic goods. But then the question arises:
can the international competitive position be maintained if capital
accumulation decelerates? Finally, there is the question of government
solvency. The budget deficit has to be eliminated in the long run and it
makes a great deal of difference how this requirement is attained. The
deficit can be eliminated by raising taxes in the course of time or by
cutting expenditure. In the latter case it may be convenient for political
reasons to cut public investment, which may have far-reaching effects on the
performance of the economy.
The questions raised above will be discussed by introducing a general
equilibrium two-country model with imperfect financial asset substitution and
imperfect commodity substitution across countries. The model takes account of
optimizing agents, finite lives, capital accumulation, intertemporal budget
constraints for the governments and private sectors, current-account dynamics
and floating exchange rates. It differs from existing two-country optimising
models (e.g., Buiter, 1986; Ciovannini, 1988; van der Ploeg, 1988; van de
Klundert and van der Ploeg, 1989) in a number of ways. Firstly, although
financial capital is highly mobile internationally, substitution of assets is
assumed to be imperfect. Studies on rates of return provide empiricalz
evidence against the notion that assets are (nearly) perfectly substitutable
(cf., Bovenberg end Goulder, 1989). Secondly, consumers' preferences are made
endogenous by assuming that international competition requires a continuous
stream of new product varieties and that the potentisl for the introduction
of product innovations depends on (relative) capital intensities. Thirdly, it
is assumed that production of commodities requires social overhead capital,
which is accumulated by government investment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is introduced
in some detail. Section 3 presents an overview of the results obtained if the
foreign government (say the US) runs a deficit for some time. Section 4
discusses numerical exercises, which provide a more elaborate picture of the
development of the wealth of nations concerned. The paper closes with some
concluding remarks.
2. A two-country model with imperfect asset and commodíty substitution
2.1 Consumption and saving decisions
The demand side of each country is made up of identical consumers with
a constant probability of death (g) and a constant pure rate oF time
preference (oc) as in the analysis of Blanchard (1985). There is no
intergenerational bequest motive. To avoid unintended bequests individuals
buy a life insurance. The individual born at time s5t receives (pays) for
every period of his life s premium, ~gW(s,t) and at the time of death the
individual's net wealth, W(s,t) gces to the life insurance company. The
consumers born at time sst have homothetic preferences over the consumption
at time t of home goods, Cd(s,t), and foreign goods, Cm(s,t). Labour supply
of individuals is inelastic. Consumers face a two-stage decision problem. In
the first stage they decide upon total consumption, C(s,t), in the present
period against total consumption later in time. To simplify somewhat it is
assumed that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is unity. In the
second stage consumers make an optimal choice with regard to home and foreign
goods given total consumption oF the first stage problem.
The first stage maximisation problem can be stated as:3
Max U(t) - tJ~ log[C(Ch(s,v), Cm(s,v)]x exp((a;g)(t-v))dv (1)
{C}
subject to the individual consumer's intertemporal budget constraint,
W(s.t) -(r(t) , j3) W(s,t) . Y(s.t) - T(s,t) - C(s.t) Pc(t) (2)
and the condition precluding Ponzi games,
Lim expL-tIm(r(N)'p) dN]W(s.v) ' U
t-~
(3)
where r denotes the real interest rate, Pc denotes the price index of the
consumption basket, Y denotes income received and T denotes lump-sum taxes
paid. The problem can be solved by standard methods (e.g., Blanchard and
Fischer, 1989). Applying the relevant aggregation procedure one can write
total consumption as:
C(s,t) Pc(t) - (atp)(W(s,t) i H(s,t))
where human wealth at time t of an individual born at time s is given by
H(s,t) - tf" [Y(s,v) - T(s,v)]x exp{-tfm (r(y,)t~)dp}dv.
The second stage maximisation problem can now be formulated as:
Max U(Ch(s,t), Cm(s,t))
{ch.cm}
subject to the budget constraint





where E denotes the real exchange rate, i.e., the price of foreign goods in
iinits of the domestic good, which the individual consumer takes as given.
Maximisation of the instantaneous utility function, which is assumed to be
homothetic, results in the following expressions:4
ch(s.t) - ~1 (E(c)) c(s,t) P~(c), al'~o (8)
Cm(s,t) - g2 (E(t)) C(s,t) Pc(t), 42'C0. (9)
Substitution of these outcomes back in the instantaneous utility function
leads to an expression for the price index of total consumption:
Pc(t) - ~3 (E(t)). (10)
To obtain aggregate results one has to sum over generations. At every
instant in time a cohort or generation with a probability of death, ~, is
born. The size at time t of a cohort born at time sst equals g exp(-~(s-t)).
Therefore, total population nt time t is tJ'p exp(-g(s-t))ds-1. The
aggregation procedure is explained in Blanchard (1985), Blanchard and Fischer
(1989) and Buiter (1988). Here it will suffice to give the results. Aggregate
consumption follows from equation (4):
C(t) Pc(t) - ( a~~) (W(t) i H(t)).
The solution for aggregate non-human wealth follows from
W(t) - r(t) W(t) i Y(t) - T(t) - C(t). (12)
The derivation of (12) made use of the fact that the non-human wealth of
newly born individuals must be zero, W(t,t)-0, because there are no bequests.
The behaviour of aggregate human wealth can be characterised by
H(t) -(r(t) ;~) H(t) - Y(t) a T(t). (13)
Aggregation over the demand equations (8) and (9) is straightforward.
However, it may be worthwhile to introduce an additional assumption. Domestic
and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes in the Armington tradition. These
goods differ because local producers supply different qualities of the same
species. Competition over qualities may not be taken for granted. Qualities
change over time and consumers have to make their choice again end again.5
Firms that do not succeed in introducing new product variants may loose
market share. Here, it will be assumed that the possibility to engage in
competition by quality is related to the reletive capital intensity of
enterprises. Firms with a relatively high capital intensity have a relatively
higher potential for innovation. These ideas can be incorporated in the
present model by assuming that all firms in each country are equal and that
the total amount of labour in each region is fixed. Denoting foreign
variables by an asterisk the aggregate version of equations (8) and (9) can
Lhen be written as:
~h(t) - 9~1 (E(t)) pl IKK(t)J C(t) Pc(t). S1')0 (14)
~m(t) - Sfl2 (E(t)) Az (KK(t), ~(t) Pc(t). g2'~0. (15)
A rise in the domestic capital stock over the foreign capital stock improves
the relative quality of domestic goods. As a consequence, consumers shift
their demand from imported goods to home produced goods2.
2.2 Portfolio choice
It is assumed that financial assets within each country are perfect
substitutes but that they are imperfect substitutes across countries. There
are several explanations for the apparent imperfect substitutability, but the
main point seems to be risk. Individuals may hold portfolios consisting of
assets of different countries despite a difference in returns, because of
exchange risks or risks of expropriation. Exchange risk could be eliminated
by assuming that agents have perfect foresight, so that they can predict
changes in the real exchange rate accurately (e.g, Branson, 1983; Branson and
Henderson, 1985). That leaves one with sovereign risk and other forms of
uncertainty.
2 Similar effects are discussed in Baldwin and Krugman (1986), althougti harm
done to domestic producers is directly related to currency appreciation in
their study.6
The modelling of imperfect substitution in assets may go along
different lines. An elegant manner would be to integrate portfolio choice
under uncertainty in the utility maximization problem of households. The
introduction of uncertainty is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Instead, a compromise procedure as in Goulder and Eichengreen (1989).
Bovenberg and Goulder (1989a), (1989b) could have been applied. In these
papers the portfolio choice is based on a preference function with the shares
devoted to domestic and foreign assets as arguments. Embedding the portfolio
preference function in the intertemporal utility function, households make
choices with regard to asset holding and consumption in a consistent way.
Here we follow s more direct approach by assuming that the shares of
assets of a given country in total wealth depend upon the relative return.
Wh - pl(r-r'aÉJ. pl')0
~m - p2(r-r'.E). p2'CO
(16)
(17)
where Bh denotes the amount of domestic assets and Bm denotes the amount of
foreign assets expressed in units of the foreign good. In contrast to
Bovenberg end Goulder (1989a and 1989b) equations (16) and (1~) take account
of exchange rate expectations, though foreign and domestic assets remain
imperfect substitutes. Clearly in a model with far-sighted agents the
exchange rate should jump in response to news about exogenous variables. It
may be argued that the procedure chosen is ad-hoc and may hamper proper
welfare comparisons. However, the argument is not fully convincing as the
utility of asset shares remains a rather opaque concept.
2.3 Production and capital accumulation
Firms produce under perfect foresight and maximise the present value of
the cash flow. V, subject to a concave and twice differentiable production
functionY- f(K,S), fK)0, fS)0, f~(0, fSS(0 (18)
where Y denotes aggregate production, K denotes the stock of privately owned
capital and S denotes the stock of social overhead capital as in Arrow and
Kurz (19~0)3. Labour input is suppressed, because it is constant; labour
supply is exogenous by assumption and a flexible real wage rate is supposed
to equate labour demand and supply at every moment in time. The remainíng
problem for the firm is to choose an optimal capital stock. To derive a well-
behaved investment function it is necessary to introduce installation cost
with respect to newly installed capital (e.g., Hayashi, 1982). The investment
expenditure function based on capital accumulation, I, and installation cost
is written as:
J' B(I.K). BI)0. gKCO. BII)0. (18)
The decision problem for the representative firm can now be formulated as:
Max V(t) ' tf~ Lf(K(v). S(v)) - g(I(v). K(v))~x exP(-tfvr(H)dN)dv (19)
subject to an intial condition for K and the accumulation equation
K(t) - I(t) - bKK(t) (20)
where bK is a constant rate of depreciation. It should be noticed, that
equation (19) implies that each country specialises in the production of its
own exportable.
Denoting the co-state variable associated with the stock of capital by
Q and applying the maximum principle results in the first order conditions
BI(IÍt). K(t)) - Q(t) (21)
3 An empirical justification for including public capital as an argument in
t.he production function is given in Aschauer (1989).8
Qít) -(r(t) ' bK) Q(t) - fKIK(t). S(t)) t BKíl(t). K(t)). (22)
Moreover, the following transversality condition must hold
lim exp[-tJ~r(t)ds] Q(v) K(v)-0. (23)
v~
Equation (21) gives the rate of investment as a function of Tobin's Q. The
behaviour of the co-state variable Q follows from equation (22).
2.4 The government budget constraint
The government services its debt (D), spends on home goods, levies
lump-sum taxes and finances the resulting deficit by borrowing. Government
spending is split among public consumption (Gc) and public investment (GI).
These assumptions are captured by the government budget constraint:
D(t) - r(t) D(t) t Gc(t) t G1(t) - T(t). (24)
The No-Ponzi-Game or solvency condition for the government can be written as:
lim exp[-tf~ r(u)du]D(v)-0. (25)
t~
Integration of equation ( 24) subject to the NPG-condition ( 25) gives
D(t) - tf~ LTÍ~) - Gc(~) - GI(~)]x exP(-tf~ r(u)dx)dv (26)
so that real government debt plus the present value of future government
spending has to be paid off by the present value of future lump-sum taxes.
Notice that the assumption of finite lives (probability of death greater than
zero) drives a wedge between the discount rate used to calculate human
wealth, rtg, and the discount rate used to calculate government debt, r. This
is the main reason why the Ricardian debt neutrality theorem does not hold,
so that the burden of higher taxation can be passed on to future generations.9
For the solvency condition of the government to be satisfied, one needs
some control rule on taxation or spending. Following Phillips (1957) three
such rules can be distinguished when applied to taxation:
(a) a proportional policy rule of the type
T(t) - To a ~1D(t)
(b) an integral control rule of the type
T(t) - -~2D(t)
(c) a derivative policy rule of the type




These rules have different implications for long-run debt in case of a
permanent increase in government spending, starting from a steady-state with
zero debt. Under rule (c) government debt falls in the new steady state, so
that the rise in exhaustive spending can be financed by a reduction in
interest payments. Under rule (b) long-run debt does not change and taxation
rises just enough to finance the increase in spending, whereas under (a)
long-run debt rises and taxation increases to cover both the increase in
exhaustive spending and the rise in debt service. Here we will stick to rule
(a) as we intend to analyse the consequences of an increase in government
debt in the short run as well as in the long run, which may follow from the
simple logic behind the proportional policy rule. However, as an alternative
to equation (27a) we will consider the case where a permanent increase in
public consumption is financed by crowding-out of public investment according
to:
~lít) - C1 - n1D(t).
0
(28)
Finally, it should be noted that the accumulation of social overhead
capitel is given by:10
S(t) - GI(t) - bas(t) (29)
where bs is a constant rate of depreciation of social overhead capital.
2.5 International interdependence
The world consists of two countries with identical structures. The
foreign country has similar relationships to the one discussed above and its
variables are denoted by an asterisk. There is no mobility of labour or
physical capital between the two countries. The condition for equilibrium in
the home goods market is given by:
Y-Cht I.GctGI ~Cm"
and the one for the foreign goods reads:
Y~ - ChM ~ I" i Gc" t GI" r Cm.
Equilibrium in the market for domestic assets is given by:




It is assumed that installation coats are such that marginal "Q" is average
"Q" (e.g. Hayashi, 1982). The left-hand side of equation (32) relates to the
supply of domestic assets, which differs from non-human wealth by the net
claim on foreign assets:
W- Bh i EBm - D r KQ t F (33)
so that F- EBm-Bm". Asset market equilibrium in the market for foreign
assets requires
D" t K"Q" - Bh t Bm. (34)11
Non-human wealth in the Foreign country is equal to
B `
W` - Bh` t É- D` ~ K`Q` - É. (35)
The current account consists of net interest payments plus the balance of
trade and equals the increase in national wealth:
F(t) -[r'ft) F É(t)] E(t)em(t) - rlt)Bm`(t) t ~m'It) - E(t)Cm(t)- (36)
3. An overview of the results
An analytic solution of the complete model is intractable. However,
solutions can be obtained for a truncated model, which may serve as a
benchmark for a discussion of simulation results. This benchmark model
focuses on real exchange rate dynamics and current account dynamics.
Investment is ignored and it is assumed that households have static
expectations with respect to future income streams. In addition, no
account is taken of the dynamics of the government budget constraint. Global
results for the benchmark model are presented in Section 3.1. Details of the
solution are given in the Appendix. The effects of an increase in government
spending in the full model are discussed in Section 3.2. In this section we
shall summarize the main results of our simulations making use of graphics
showing the time paths of some key variables in the model. A more detailed
discussion of the outcomes will be given in the next section.
3.1. The benchmark model
The state variables in the benchmark model are the real exchange rate,
which is a forward looking variable and foreign debt, which is a backward






In the Appendix it is shown by linearizing the model in the neighbourhood of
a steady state solution that both the E - 0 locus and the F- 0 locus are
negatively sloped. Moreover, it can be proved that for reasonable values of
the parameters that the slope of the E- 0 locus is larger in absolute value
than the slope of the F- 0 locus. Therefore, the system exhibits saddlepoint
stability. The initial equilibrium is at point A in Figure 1.
The negative slope of the F- 0 locus can be explained as follows.
Starting from a point on the curve an appreciation of the domestic real
exchange rate (E~,) induces a trade deficit which is to be offset by rising
income on foreign assets through rising foreign claims (F'r). Following
Stevenson et.al. (1988) this may be seen as the open economy variant of the
"coupon effect". The negative slope of the E- 0 locus relates to the role of
exchange rate expectations in the model. The announcement of a current
account improvement will generate expectations of a fall in the exchange
rate. Therefore, an effective increase in foreign assets (F'T) accompanied by
an appropriate appreciation of the real exchange rate (E,~) may keep
expectations from changing.
The effects of an increase in government spending abroad, say the US,
are illustrated in Figure 1. As shown in the Appendix the E- 0 locus and the
F- 0 locus shift upwards and a new steady state is attained at point B. On13
impact of the shock the real exchange rate jumps towards the stable arm of
the saddlepath (the dotted line in Figure 1). A positive demand shock in the
US induces a real dollar appreciation and a current account deficit as net
exports are crowded out. Over time the system moves along the stable arm of
the saddlepath towards point B. US foreign debt rises end a real dollar
depreciation is required to restore long-run equilibrium. In the long run the
"crowding-out" effect may still dominate the coupon effect, so that the real
exchange rate in dollar terms is higher in the new steady state compared to
its initial position.
In the complete model there are a number of factors which complicate
the picture. First, the foreign government has to finence an increase in
exhaustive expenditure. This may lead to a rise in the supply of foreign
bonds. Second, increasing interest rates depress private investment so that
the supply of goods diminishes. This negative "supply effect" reinforces the
excess demand for US goods and therefore contributes to an appreciation of
the real dollar rate. However, the shift in preferences which may be related
to diverging capital intensities in both economies works in the opposite
direction. Finally, it makes a great difference whether the solvency problem
of the government is solved by raising taxes or by cutting public investment.
In Section 3.2 these factors will be taken into account in discussing the
effects of an increase in government spending abroad.
3.2 The complete model
A rise in government spending in the foreign country (say the US) may
lead to different results if the solvency requirement of the government is
maintained by a tax rule, but preferences may or may not change in line with
capital accumulation. Some global results for the latter case are shown in
Figure 2. On impact there is a real dollar appreciation as US goods are in
excess demand. Over time the real exchange rate first falls but rises
slightly afterwards under impact of the negative "supply effect". Ultimately,
the rate stabilises at a level above the initial steady state value. There is
no need for a real dollar depreciation in the long run to service foreign
debt ("coupon effect"). Because investment is crowded out US goods remain in
short. supply and the "coupon effect" is dominated by the "crowding out"14
effect. The long-run result corresponds to the outcome in the benchmark model
of Section 3.1. Foreign debt increases and private consumption in the US
falls substantislly. The fall in consumption is the net result of a crowding-
out effect accompanied by a decline in the stock of capital on the one hand
and a positive terms-of-trade effect on the other hand. For Europe the latter
effects are, of course, the opposite and consumption increases on balance in
this region.
Figure 3 shows what may happen if ceteris paribus preferences shift
towards the domestic good, because the US is not able to maintain its
relative position in international markets. Under these circumstances the
real dollar depreciation which comes after the positive jump on impact is
substantially. Over time the real exchange rate falls to a level below the
initiel steady state solution. The "coupon effect" and the "preference drift"
effect cannot be matched by the supply-side effect resulting from the
decumulation of capital, so that the dollar depreciates in real terms in the
long run. The decline in US consumption is therefore larger than in the
previous case, while Europe gains slightly from an endogenous shift in
preferences. Under these unfavourable circumstances US external debt rises
towards a higher long-run equilibrium level.
Things are quite different if solvency of the government is maintained
by a control rule on public investment as appears from Figure 4. In this case
it is assumed that there is no shift in preferences, so that the results
presented in Figure 4 should be compared with those shown in Figure 2. Under
a rule on public investment the real exchange rate jumps upwards on impact
and falls subsequently as the "coupon effect" requires a real dollar
depreciation to cope with a fast rising external debt. Crowding-out of
government investment leads to a fall in socisl overhead capital in the
course of time. As a result output decreases substantially in the US. The
fall in output is caused by the combined effect of a decline in private
capital and a decline in social overhead capital. When these developments get
momentum things are more or less abruptly reversed. The "supply effect"
induces a gradual real dollar appreciation, which breaks the Fast increase in
external debt. As the real dollar appreciation continues foreign debt rises
again as US goods are in excess demand. Long-run consumption falls
substantially in the US economy despite a significant improvement in the
terms of trade. The outcome for European welfare remains to be seen. As will15
be shown in Section 4 long-run aggregate consumption falls slightly in Europe
under influence of the adverse terms-of-trade effect.
Figure 5 shows what may happen in the worst of all cases from a welfare
point of view. Solvency of the government is assured by a rule on public
investment and preferences shift according to changes in the relatíve capital
intensities of regions. At first, the picture resembles that of Figure 4. The
dollar depreciates rather fast and US external debt rises at high speed. But
now the movements are not reversed when the supply of US goods falls as a
result of capital decumulation in the private and the public sector. The
shift in preferences at the expense of the US economy dominates the pure
"supply effect" and the real depreciation of the dollar continues, although
at a lower rate. The unfavourable position of US suppliers in international
markets is also reflected in the rise of external debt. In the new steady
state US foreign debt is higher than in the case without preference drift.
The "coupon effect" imposes therefore a high burden on the economy, which in
combination with the negative terms-of-trade effect and the negative "supply
effect" contributes to a dramatic fall in consumption. Europe profits from
these developments. The "coupon effect" and the "terms of trade effect" are
favourable for Europe and dominate the negative "supply effect". Crowding-out
of investment in Europe is restricted because of an imperfect functioning of
the international capital market. In the next section these and other
interrelations will be discussed in more detail.
4. Simulation results: a closer look
The numerical effects of an increase in US government spending by 5x of
GNP are presented ín Tables 1-44. The results under a tax rule to assure
government solvency are discussed in Subsection 4.1. In this connection a
distinction is made between a situation with constant preferences and a
4 Computations are based on the algorithm presented in Markink and van der
Ploeg (1989). To apply the algorithm the model has to be linearized around a
steady state solution. The log linear version of the model along with the
parameter values applied in the simulations is given in the Appendix.16
situation in which reletive preferences depend on relative capital
intensities. The numerical outcomes under a rule on public investment are
discussed in Subsection 4.2. Here again, a comparison is made between the
situation with and without a shift in preferences.
4.1 A fiscal deficit under a tax-rule
The effects of a rise in government spending under a tax rule are shown
in Tables 1 and 2. As the model assumes forward-lookíng behaviour of agents
it may be useful to discuss the long-run results first. We start with a
discussion of the case with constant preferences (Table 1). Covernment debt
in the foreign country, say the US, increases substantislly in the long run.
Therefore the interest rate on dollar denominated bonds rises, which leads to
a crowding-out of investment in the US economy. Because foreign and domestic
bonds are imperfect substitutes the rise in the European interest rate stays
behind the increase in the US interest rate. Investment in Europe is
therefore less depressed. The rise in 3nterest rates end fall in output (as a
result of the decline in capital) reduce human wealth in both regions. The
decline in human wealth is, of course, more pronounced in the US where taxes
must be increased to eliminate the government deficit.
With respect to non-human wealth the developments across countries are
qualitatively different. In the US non-human wealth declines for two reasons.
Firstly, as noted above the capital stock falls. Secondly, external debt
rises as a result of deficits on the current account. In Europe the stock of
capital declines somewhat but the stock of foreign assets rises and as a
result non-human wealth increases on balance. This explains the rise in
European consumption, whereas total consumption in the US falls significantly
despite an increase in the US terms of trade. A real dollar appreciation
leads to a decline in consumers prices in the US and vice versa in Europe.
The outcome with respect to the real exchange rate is the net result of
opposing forces. The relatively large decline in the US output raises the
relative price of US goods (supply effect). In contrast, the interest
payments on foreign debt (coupon effect) require a real dollar depreciation.
In our exercise the supply effect dominates the coupon effect, as illustrated
in Table 1.17
The short-run picture is quite different. On impact of the shock human
wealth falls in both countries. This leads to a decline in consumption flows
in both regions. It should be observed in this connection that human wealth
is a forward-looking variable which reFlects the fall in income and rise of
interest rates in the future. The European pattern of consumption and real
wealth is remarkable. Human wealth falls below its long-run value and savings
increase in the short run as well as in the medium run. The tilt in the
consumption pattern implies that instantaneous welfare (which can be measured
by aggregate consumption) increases in the long run. There is a real dollar
appreciation on impact, as US goods are in excess demand. The European import
oF goods declines substantislly, whereas import in the US rises. A similar
pattern can be deduced with respect to the allocation of domestic and foreign
bonds.
As can be observed, the results differ from the standard Mundell-
Fleming model, where an increase in government spending is a locomotive
policy in the short run. In the present model a rise in government spending
in the US is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy in the short run, but it allows
Europe to have a higher welfare level in the long run. Instantaneous welfare
in the US falls gradually, but it should be noted that the increase in public
expenditure may convey direct utility to consumers. The rise in the real
interest rate is higher in the US over the entire period, because the supply
of US bonds increases until a new steady state is attained.
The effects of an endogenous shift in consumecs' preferences are taken
into account in the outcomes of Table 2. As before, the stock of capital in
the US falls by more than the stock of capital in Europe. As a consequence of
these divergent developments the competitive position of US suppliers of
goods deteriorates, as explained in Section 2. The main difference with the
results in Table 1 relates to the long-run change in the real exchange rate.
The real dollar depreciation in the long run now reflects the change in
preferences away from US gods and in favour of European goods. A real dollar
depreciation rises the consumers price in the US and depresses consumption
and welfare as appears from Table 2. Europe gains in the long run because its
terms of trade improve and also because the US incurs a larger foreign debt
with correspondingly higher debt service. As appears from a comparison of thc
results in Tables 1 and 2 effects on impact are almost similar. Changes in18
competitive positions build up gradually and have their main impact in the
long run.
4.2 A fiscal deficit under a rule on public investment
The outcomes in case of constant preferences are presented in Table j.
The budget deficit in the US ís now closed by crowding out of government
investment. The corresponding decline in the stock of social overhead capital
leads to a deterioration of the marginal productivity of privately owned
capital. As a result, the accumulation of capital is seriously affected in
the US. A comparison of the long-run results in Tables 1 and j shows to what
extent the stock of capital is reduced under an investment rule in comparison
with a tax rule. As a result of the dramatic decline in the stock of capital
US output falls substantially. The resulting excess demand for goods
originating in the US induces a real dollar appreciation of about 6.5X in the
long-run. Total consumption gains from the improvement in the terms of trade,
the ultimate result is nevertheless strongly negative because real human and
non-human wealth is severely depressed. The long-run effect on European
consumption and welfare is slightly negative, because of the deterioration in
the European terms of trade. US foreign debt changes by about the same amount
in both cases. The fall in private capital accumulation has therefore no
specific consequences for the external position in the long-run. However,
there lie different stories behind these more or less equal long-run results.
This is best seen by turning to the short-run eFFects in the case of a rule
on public investment.
The impact effects of a chenge in exhaustive government spending in the
US are dominated by the reaction pattern in Europe. The tilt of the
consumption path in Europe is now more pronounced as output declines more in
the present case. Human wealth falls significantly and consumption slows down
correspondingly. This leads to a real dollar appreciation, which is more than
twice as high compared with the case of a tax rule. The improvement in the
terms of trade allow the US to consume even more in the short run (see Table
3). The increase in welfare is the net result of higher imports and a lower
demand of domestic goods. The reallocation of bond holdings across countries19
also reflects the real dollar appreciation as can be deduced from the results
in Table j.
'[Tiere nre a number of interesting developments in the medium run which
can be traced by comparing again Tables 1 and 3. Under an investment-cule the
US balance on payments on current account deteriorates fast as a consequence
of the real dollar appreciation on impact. The coupon effect gains in
importance and the dollar has to depreciate in real terms to prevent an
explosive development. The real exchange rate attains its lowest value at t-7
(e--0.68~. Thereafter, the process is reversed as excess demand for US
denominated goods becomes again the dominating factor. But this time excess
demand is not caused by a fall in foreign demand as at t-0, but by the fall
in US supply under influence of a decline in the stock of private and social
capital. The parabolic shape of the time path of the real exchange rate of
the dollar is typical for the case of a rule on public investment compared
with a stabilizing rule based on taxes. However, things alter again if in
addition to the investment rule account is taken of changes in competitive
positions.
The numerical outcomes of the last mentioned case are presented in
Table 4. The real dollar depreciates substantially in the long run, because
now excess demand of US goods is smaller as demand for these goods declines.
The relative quality of European goods improves as the US falls behind in
capital accumulation. In addition, external debt is higher in the new steady
state so that the coupon effect has a strong downward influence on the real
exchange rate of the dollar. Welfare in the US declines markedly, whereas
welfare in Europe improves significantly as a result of an increase in
foreign claims as well as the real dollar depreciation, leading to a fall in
European consumers prices.
The short-run effects in Tables 3 and 4 show not much difference. Human
we~]th in Europe falls agaiin on impact of the shock, which reflects the
Jc~ 1 in~~ in fulrn~~~ inrum~~ rurd incrivrxc In 1'uLrnr. Inlcrevt. rnl.c4. '11ic dol liu-
exchange rate in dollar terms appreciates and consumption in the US increases
in the short run. In the medium run the dollar falls faster in real terms in
case preferences shift in favour of European goods and the coupon effect
gains in importance.
It can be concluded, that the US is worst off in the situation where
budget deficits are eliminated at the expense of public investment outlays20
and the competition on the world market requires a high level of capital
accumulation to stay in the race. Under these circumstances government debt
incurred by lavish spending in the short run becomes a real burden in the
long run which may take dramatic proportions.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper focusses on imbalances in the world economy caused by a
unilateral increase in government spending, say in the US. The results depend
on the type of control rule applied to maintain solvency of the governments.
It is argued that proportional rules are most likely to be applied from a
political point of víew.
An increase in US government spending under a tax rule induces a real
dollar appreciation and a rise in interest rates in the short run. Aggregate
consumption and investment as well as exports are choked off to maintain
equilibrium in the goods market. Aggregate consumption in Europe falls
because its terms of trade deteriorate.
In the longer run developments are to a large extent determined by the
process of capital decumulation, which is most pronounced in the US.
Imperfections in the capital markets restrict the rise in European interest
rates so that capital accumulation is less affected. Goods produced in the US
are therefore continuously in short supply. As US external debt rises the
dollar depreciates in real terms, but the "coupon effect" is mitigated by the
"supply effect", implying that mutations in the real exchange rate are
moderate. In the long run the US terms of trade improve but aggregate
(private) consumption falls along with a decline in real wealth. In contrast,
aggregate consumption in Europe rises somewhat as a result of the increase in
(net) foreign wealth.
Under a rule on public investment private and socisl overhead capital
are crowded out in concert. Real wealth and aggregate consumption decline
substantially. Movements in the real exchange rate are now primarily governed
by the supply effect. In the long run the terms of trade of the US economy
improve significantly. As a consequence long-run aggregate consumption in
Europe falls slightly.zl
The long-run prospects for the European economy look better if a
decumulation of capital worsens the competitive position of the US economy.
Under these circumstances the dollar depreciates in the long-run as US goods
become relatively less desirable. Europe gains and the US looses in terms of
welfare, because US external debt becomes higher and also because the terms
of trade turn against the latter country. The examples illustrate the dangers
of short-sighted economic policy measures if account is taken of their full
long-run implications. Government debt imposes a burden on future generations
if as a result capital accumulation is impaired. In turn this may affect
other factors of economic growth as emphasized in recent studies on the
subject (e.g., Lucas, 1988; Grossman and Helpman, 1989). Imperfections in
capital markets reduce the negative spill-over effects to other regions and
therefore increase the long-run burden for the (net) debtor country.2z
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Total consumption (c) -2.91 -1.40 1.4~
Consumption domestic goods (ch) -1.18 0.06 2.43
Consumption foreign goods (cm) -8.10 -5.79 -1.40
Non-human wealth (w) -0.05 0.99 3-21
xuman wealth (h) -9.99 -7.3G -3.G7
Capital stock (k) 0 -0.17 -2.78
Interest rate (r) -0.16 0.02 0.14
Government debt (d) 0 -0.03 0.31
Domestic bonds (bh) -0.34 O.OÏ 1.2~
Foreign bonds (bm) -2.38 1.71 9.04
US
Total consumption (c') -1.91 -2.83 -10.61
Consumption domestic goods (ch') -3.64 -4.30 -11.5~
Consumption foreign goods (cm ) 3.28 1.56 -~.74
Non-human wealth (w') -1.z5 -1.~3 -l0.02
Human wealth (h') -8.91 -10.89 -15.34
Capital stock (k') 0 -1.11 -8.85
Interest rate (r') -0.11 0.16 0.45
Government debt (d') 0 10.15 12.11
Domestic bonds (bh ) -0.96 -0.82 -8.09
Foreign bonds (bm') 1.08 -2.46 -15.86
World
Real exchange rate (e) 3.46 2.93 1.91
US foreign debt (f) 0 1.42 5.36
a) Variables are expressed as percentage deviations from initial steady state
values (except f for which it is the deviation as a percentage of W and r,
r', For which it is 100 times the absolute deviations).29
Table 2: Fiscal deficit US under a tax-rule; endogenous preferences
variablea)
period 0 5 m
Europe
Total consumption (c) -2.80 -1.08 3.33
Consumption domestic goods (ch) -1.02 -0.38 3-72
Consumption foreign goods (cm) -8.15 -5.48 2.14
Non-human wealth (w) -0.15 0.89 3.73
Human wealth (h) -8.96 -6.35 -3.63
Capital stock (k) 0 -0.25 -3.28
Interest rate (r) -0.16 0.03 0.17
Covernment debt (d) 0 -0.01 0.37
Domestic bonds (bh) -0.46 0.03 2.12
Foreign bonds (b ) -2.48 2.23 14.44
m
US
Total consumption (c') -1.86 -3.03 -12.46
Consumption domestic goods (ch') -3.65 -4.50 -12.68
Consumption foreign goods (cm') 3.49 1.37 -11.27
Non-human wealth ( w~) -1.24 -1.76 -10.55
Human wealth (h') -8.82 -10.75 -14.78
Capital stock (k') 0 -1.09 -8.34
Interest rate (r`) -0.11 0.17 0.43
Government debt (d') 0 10.16 12.06
Domestic bonds (bh`) -0.93 -0.90 -8.94
Foreign bonds (bmM) 1.09 -3.10 -21.26
World
Real exchange rate (e) 3.57 2.09 -4.26
US Foreign debt (f) 0 1.48 6.29
a) See Table 1.30





Total consumption (c) -10.14 -0.82 -0.03
Consumption domestic goods (ch) -7.09 -1.28 3.19
Consumption foreign goods (cm) -19.31 0-55 -9-69
Non-human wealth (w) 1.19 3.06 2.79
Human wealth (h) -47.84 -17.48 -3.25
Capital stock (k) o 0.79 -3-12
Interest rate (r) -0.18 -0.16 0.14
Government debt (d) 0 -0.33 0.30
Domestic bonds (bh) 0.59 2-58 1-75
Foreign bonds (bm) -2.53 5.90 0.49
US
Total consumption (c`) 1.12 -1.02 -20.26
Consumption domestic goods (ch') -1.94 -0.57 -23.48
Consumption foreign goods ( cmM) 10.29 -2.40 -10.60
Non-human wealth ( w') -0.13 -0.36 -21.46
Human wealtn (h') -1.52 -2.54 -23.53
Capital stock (k") 0 -0.24 -23.25
Interest rate (r") -0.08 -0.09 0.30
Government debt (d') 0 9-78 11.78
Domestic bonds (bh") 0.46 0.12 -20.42
Foreign bonds (bm") 3-58 -3-20 -19.16
World
Real exchange rate (e) 6.11 -0.92 6.44
US foreign debt (f) 0 1.63 5-22
a) See Table 1.31





Total consumption (c) -10.00 -0.42 5.84
Consumption domestic goods (ch) -6.88 -0.87 7.17
Consumption foreign goods (cm) -19.35 0-92 1.85
Non-humen wealth (w) 1.07 2.91 4.32
Human wealth (h) -46.47 -16.02 -5.20
capital stock (k) 0 0.69 -5.00
Interest rate (r) -0.17 -0.15 0.22
Covernment debt (d) 0 -0.31 0.49
Domestic bonds (bh) 0.44 2.48 4.31
Fcreign bonds (bm) -2.65 6.44 18.05
US
Total consumption (c') 1.17 -1.23 -26.13
Consumption domestic coods (ch') -1.94 -0.78 -27.47
Consumption foreign goods (cm') 10.53 -2.57 -22.14
Non-human wealth (w') -0.13 -0.38 -22.99
Ruman wealth (h') -1.41 -2.35 -21.58
Capital stock (k') 0 -0.23 -21.37
Interest rate (r') -0.07 -0.08 0.22
Government debt (d') 0 9.78 11.60
Domestic bonds (bh') 0.50 0.05 -22.98
Foreisn bonds (bm') 3.59 -3.91 -36.73
World
Real exchange rate (e) 6.23 -1.81 -13.71
US foreign debt (f) 0 1.71 8.22
a) See 1'able 1.1
Appendix to "Crowding Out and the Wealth of Nations"
i. The linear version of the complete model
The model presented in the paper is lïnearized around a steady state
solution. Lower-case letters denote percentage deviations from the steady
state solutions of the corresponding variables denoted by upper-case letters.
An exception is the rate of interest, which is measured as an absolute
deviation from the initial steady state value, r.
Aggregate consumption
c' Pc - ~w ~(1-~)h. ;~ WWH (A.1)
Consumption of domestic goods
Ch
ch - c ~(1-p,) P Lete(k-k")~. u' C
Consumption of foreign goods
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k
Production
Y - Ys t (1-v)~oc.l t (1-oc)k~
Aggregate demand
Y - Ycch'Yil ` YgBi ` (1-Yc-Yi-Yg)cm~ t ~c
ch I ~i

















nk . (1-n)d - abh . (1-a)bm
Human wealth
h - (r~p)h t r - (r;s)(Y-t)
Tobin's g
9 - r9 ' r - (rtbk)(Y-k)
Accumulation of private capital
k - bk(i-k)
Accumulation of social overhead capital
s - bs(Bi-s)
Government budget constraint
d- rd f r. y(gc-t) t yggi, y~ D
Solvency rules
~
t- t f 1 d -o y
nl












Balance of payments constraint




Exogenous variables are underlined. Coefficients which are not defined are
taken from the original model or are explained below. Equations (A.2) and
(A.3) are obtained from an instantaneous CES-utility function:
U- [pCh~~ (1-p)Cm~]1~W with elasticity of substitution qr - 11W and
preference parameter, p, determined by: p-pof~lE. The derivation of the
investment equation (A.5) and the equation for the Jco-state variable q is
based on an investment expenditure function with quadratic cost of adjustment
in net investment: J- I.(2xKK)2 and a Cobb-Douglas production:
Y v a 1-oc 1-y - uS (L K ) . Linearization of the other equations is straightforwacd.
It should be noted that deviations of lump-sum taxes (t) and government
consumption (gc) are expressed as a percentage of initial output, whereas the
deviation of external debt is expressed as a percentage of initial wealth.
This is necessary because in the initial steady state these variables are
assumed to be zero.
The linearized equations for the foreign country are similar to (A.1)-
(A.18). The model can be solved for 23 output variables (viz., c, pc, ch, cm,
i, y, bh, bm, w, r, t(gi) for both countries and e) and 12 state variables
(viz., k, h, s, d, f, q for both countries). Invoking Walras' law one of the
equilibrium conditions can be eliminated, so that the number of equation
equals the number of variables. There are 4 forward-looking state variables
(viz., h, q, for both countries) and 9 backward-looking state variables, but
the variable f~ can be omitted for convenience.
The numerical examples are based on the following plausible parameter values.
Households
~-2. N-o.75. ~-0.8, g-o.02. E-0,1.0. p-5, a-o.84
Firms
v-0.2, a-0.6, k-0.125, Sk-o.o25
Government
y-1, bs'0.02. ~1-0. 0.5. n1-o, 0.5
Miscellaneous
yo-o.5, yi-o.2, yg-o.1, n-o.8, r-o.o5
In all cases considered the model exhibits saddlepath stability.
2. The benchmark model
The benchmark model is obtained by ignoring investment and capital,
assuming static expectations of households and eliminating the government
budget constraint (including the solvency rules). The only exogenous variable
taken into account is exhaustive government spending.
The log-linear version of the model can be written as
Domestic country
c t (1-k)e - ~w - ~r
ch - c t ( 1-x)y~e
cm-c-H~





cw - (1-}4)e - 3w. - ~rw
Chw - Cw - (1-p)9~e
cmw - cw ' u~





f- rF ~( 1-1)(r'ié-r) t x(cm'-c-cm)
abh f (1-a)bm~ - ~
There are no taxes, so that human capital only depends on the rate of
interest. Output is fixed and the initiel current account is in equilibrium.
As a result we have H- Ch - Yh
Substitution of the equations for both countries in the two equations,
which characterise international interdependence, yields a system of two
differential equations in e and f:
é - ~1-~ ; 2(1- ){2 ( -1)tl}~e ~ ~~ t 2~-I~F } 1 ~
2p ~ 2H-1 ~ 2p ~ 2u-1 (~c- ~c)
f - ~r t (2a-2P(1-a)~F ~ {x{2}~Zu-1)al} f (12P)Z~e
a ~- (~c - ~c')
Assuming that the Marshall Lerner conditions are fulfilled and assuming local
goods preference x) 0.5 as well as local asset preference A) 0.5 the é- 0
locus and the f- 0 locus will both have a negative slope. For saddlepoínt
stability it is required that the f- 0 locus is Flatter than the é- 0 locus





The condition on the relative position of both curves can be expressed as
~ ~ 2~-1 r t 2a-1
2 ~ 1-~ 2
1-~ 2 1- 2 -1 ~1 1-~ 2 1 tl
2p ; ~ 2u-1 2p ' 1-a 2k-1
In the present model we have x-(1-H)y. Therefore, the denominators in the




which sets an upper bound on the interest elasticity of consumption. This
condition may be fulfilled for a realistic range of parameter values.
However, the denominators do not need to be equsl. The denominator on the RHS
of the inequality may be smaller, which sets a lower bound on the income -
wealth ratio in the initisl situation:
Taken together both conditions are too strong. More in general, y should not
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